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Product acquisition and sustainment have traditionally been separate and not 
necessarily equal concerns in defense acquisition.  To reconcile this deficiency, the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) proposed a modernization of the defense acquisition 
process that resulted in the adoption of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), which 
integrates a performance-based environment for both acquisition and sustainment. The 
basic tenets of PBL suggest that the governance structure used must address the potential 
long-term nature of the relationship between the government and suppliers by integrating 
more collaboration and adaptability into the contractual mechanism.  Knowing this, the 
ultimate challenge for a contractor is being able to understand the relationship they have 
with the government and be able to evaluate whether the governance structure chosen 
permits, inhibits, or prohibits the government and contractor from achieving desired 
outcomes.   
The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual model that describes the 
conditions under which defense acquisitions should be structured as either being more 
short-term, transactional exchanges; long-term relational exchanges; or plural form (which 
recognizes the complementary nature of contracts and cooperative norms).  Using this 
conceptual model coupled with the logic provided by Transaction Cost Theory (TCE), we 
should be able to better explain whether the government-contractor relationship has a 
significant impact on the outcome of the contract.  For those contracts that fail as a result of 
endogenous conditions, we realign those programs with alternative contract types and 
alternative governance structures that are more suitable for the conditions of those 
programs.  We conclude this study with a discussion of how managers should match 
contract type with optimal governance structure and a preliminary empirical examination of 
the conceptual model. 
Background and Concepts 
Performance-Based Contracts 
Geary and Vitasek (2008) argue that longer term contracts encourage long-term 
investments to improve product or process inefficiencies.  Their logic is that long-term 
(greater than one year) contracts justify higher up-front investments on the part of the 
contractor, while short-term (one year or less) contracts generally discourage up-front 
investment on the part of the contractor and are therefore less effective at obtaining a higher 
degree of performance.  Keeping this in mind, we recognize that because the preferred PBL 




only choosing to invest in the acquisition of a technology or system, it is also investing in a 
relationship with that contractor.   
Formal Contracts 
There are different schools of thought concerning the impact of formal contracts on 
the relationship between the parties involved.  Ghoshal and Moran (1996) and Fehr and 
Gachter (2000) argue that formal contracts may signal distrust which could encourage one 
or all of the parties to exhibit opportunistic behavior.  Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that 
when relational governance exists, formal contracts are an unnecessary expense and could 
potentially be counter-productive.  Other scholars seem to think that because transactional 
uncertainty is inherent in long-term contracts, having formal agreements are necessary for 
combating market dynamism (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972), which is a result of evolving 
technology, shifting prices, or variance in product availability (Cannon et al., 2000).   
Cooperative Norms 
We define the term cooperative norms as being the relational norms that exist 
outside of the formal contract.  In other words, if a formal contract establishes a set of legal 
conditions, in theory, the relational norms that exist between the parties involved are the 
means by which those conditions are satisfied.  Williamson (1993) argues that contractual 
incompleteness notwithstanding, an ex post maladaptation problem will not arise if (1) the 
parties promise to disclose all relevant information and behave cooperatively during contract 
execution and renewals, and (2) these promises are self-enforcing.  We view cooperative 
norms as being complementary to formal contracts, which agrees with Gundlach, 1999; 
Gulati, 1995; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Allen and Lueck, 1992.    
Transaction Cost Theory 
When it comes to understanding how managers construct governance 
arrangements, transaction cost theory has become a common supposition for explaining the 
rationale behind these arrangements.  Understanding the impact of transaction costs will 
allow contractors in the defense industry to better articulate and account for the hazards 
associated with multi-party, multi-year procurement and sustainment contracts. 
The theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is centered on two basic principles: 
(1) human beings are bounded rationally, and (2), as a result of being rationally bound, will 
always choose to further their own self-interest (i.e., opportunism) (Williamson, 1985).  
Within the context of TCE, scholars define three categories of exchange hazards that 
require contractual safeguards: (1) asset specificity, (2) difficulty of measurement, and (3) 
uncertainty.  Asset specificity arises as sourcing relationships require significant relationship-
specific investments in physical and/or human assets (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  Difficulty of 
measurement arises when the rewards given to a contractor cannot be objectively linked to 
a set of performance parameters.  Lastly, uncertainty arises because of one’s inability to 
know and account for all hazards that occur as a result of seen and/or unforeseen changes.   
Several variables give rise to transaction cost issues in the defense industry.  Some 
of the most commonly recognized are the defense budget cycle, rapidly evolving 
technology, a bimodal distribution in the age of government employees, and a giant gap 
between first and third-tier suppliers (Chao, 2005).  Although the degree of significance may 
vary greatly amid these and other variables, we assume that their collective impact on the 




we believe that both the government and the contractor construct contractual agreements 
that: (a) reduce the level of risk assumed by the contractor, and (b) provide a product or 
service that meets the government’s needs at a reasonable price. 
Governance. Over the past 30-40 years, several scholars have contended that 
interorganizational exchanges are driven by variables outside of the formal contract.  
Governance emerges from the values agreed-upon processes found in social relationships 
(Macneil, 1978; 1980; Noordewier et al., 1990; Heide & John, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
Tubig and Abetti (1990) found that both exogenous (external) and endogenous (internal) 
variables influence contractual performance.  Their research found that endogenous 
variables such as type of R&D, type of solicitation, and type of contract, all had an effect on 
contractual performance.   
When we think about specific types of governance structures we see governance as 
existing along a spectrum that moves from transactional to relational (see Conceptual 
Model).  Transactional governance implies that there are fewer hazards to exchange (i.e., 
environmental uncertainty, transaction-specific investments, or difficulty in measurement); 
therefore, continual interaction between the government and the contractor may be 
unnecessary.  Relational governance, on the other hand, implies that there are greater 
hazards to exchange; therefore, continual interaction would be needed between the 
government and the contractor to ensure that both players are acting in ways that reflect 
their mutual interests and not in ways that exhibit opportunism. 
We hypothesize that for a large majority of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), contractual success is permitted when there is a strong mix of both legal and 
social conventions.  This plural form governance structure, however, does have both pros 
and cons.  According to Dyer (1996) and Dyer and Singh (1998), social governance may 
lead to a reduction in transaction costs when compared to formal contracts.  Gundlach 
(2000), however, takes the view that the institution of social norms requires a history of 
interaction and reinforcement, whereas the absence of such a history could lead to conflict, 
distrust, and opportunism.   
Conceptual Model 
In government contracting, formal contracts serve as the primary governing 
mechanism for acquiring and supplying organizations.  Yet studies consistently report that 
performance is typically higher among organizations that use non-legal principles to govern 
the relationship among the buyers and suppliers.  Our conceptual model aligns the 
alternative governance structures derived from transaction cost economics, normative 
structures derived from relational exchange theory, and plural forms derived from the joining 
of these two frameworks to explain the three possible mechanisms for governing DoD 
contractual relationships.  The model also describes the hazards of exchange and 
moderating variables that suggest a shift from more traditional transactional exchanges to 
more relational exchanges.  Finally, the model provides a framework for aligning alternative 
contract mechanisms with the optimal governance structures and accessing the impact of 





Figure 1. Matching Award Type with Optimal Governance in DoD Acquisitions 
Type of Contract 
FAR 16.101(b) states the following: “contract types are grouped into two broad 
categories: fixed-price contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts.”  On one end of the 
contractual spectrum you have the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract where there is no 
mitigation of the cost risk associated with producing an end item by the government; 
therefore, the contractor assumes all of the cost risk associated with that end item.  On the 
other end of that spectrum you have the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract where 
objective incentive targets are not feasible for critical aspects of performance; therefore, the 
government’s objectives are more broad, giving the contractor flexibility to interpret how to 
achieve those objectives.  As a result of those broad objectives, the government chooses to 
share in the risk associated with creating that end item. 
The contractual spectrum reveals certain proclivities about the types of relationships 
one would find given certain types of contracts.  As an example for major weapon systems 
(MWS), under an FFP contract, the government is not investing in any of the current 
developmental risk associated with that product; therefore, the type of relationship the 
government has with the contractor may not be a critical issue.  On the other hand, under a 
CPAF contract, the government is investing in the development of a product that may be 
currently immature, or perhaps, does not even exist; therefore, we assume that the success 








Using contract data housed by the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) 
coupled with performance data found in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) housed by 
the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system, we evaluated 
16 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that spanned across the different service 
branches.  Three programs were selected from the US Army, 3 from the US Air Force, 5 
from the US Navy, and 5 programs were classified as Joint Service Products (see Appendix 
A).  The programs selected were based upon a predetermined set of criteria that allowed the 
analysis done to be well-balanced.     
Matching Contract Type with the Appropriate Governance 
Structure 
When one considers the type of contractual mechanism and governing structure that 
should be applied to a particular program or project, it is important to first evaluate the types 
of variables that would, or could potentially, have the most significant impact on the overall 
success of the project.  In the defense industry, some of the variables to consider would be 
relational history (contractor-government and/or contractor-contractor), duration of the 
contract, level of investment risk, wartime verses peacetime, state of the economy, rate of 
technological change for the item being procured, and complexity of development.   
As a contractor, it is vital to understand the role the firm plays in the defense 
industry.  This will allow the firm to better predict which variables could have the greatest 
impact on the firm’s ability to achieve desired outcomes.  Once those variables have been 
identified and a suitable governance structure has been selected for dealing with those 
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